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 Introduction  
In recent years, there have been increasing concerns about how privatization and 
market-liberalization reforms in the public utility industries have been affecting low-
income households in developing and transition economies.  Moreover, escalating 
energy prices have given rise to real and growing affordability problems for many 
utility customers in the advanced industrial countries.  Indeed, there are frequent press 
reports on the economic hardships faced by households that are struggling to pay their 
rising utility bills and are forced to choose between paying for food and medicine, and 
making their homes livable during the coldest months of winter and the scorching heat 
of the summer.  And these distressing affordability problems are likely to become 
exarcebated in the context of the current global financial crisis.    There is also growing 
anxiety about the potential impacts of the costs of addressing climate change on the 
price consumers must pay for energy, transportation, and more indirectly food, housing, 
and other essential products and services. 
State-owned monopolies provided most utility services in developing and 
transition economies until the early 1990s. However, in the face of growing fiscal 
pressures, extraordinarily low levels of operating performance, rapid technological 
change, and a revolution in economic thinking, many governments began to reject the 
model of monolithic state-owned utilities, introducing a combination of institutional 
reforms that included privatization, regulatory reform, and competition in areas where it 
was viable.  Although these changes were generally an integral part of reform programs 
intended to improve efficiency, remove constraints on investment, align tariffs with 
costs, and reduce the fiscal burden imposed by loss-making state-owned utilities, many 
observers were concerned that these reforms might have a negative impact on low-
income households. 
In particular, some worried that competition would make the traditional method 
of financing access for low-income households--cross-subsidies from higher income 
customers--more difficult.  The fear was that new competitors entering the market 
would target only the most profitable customers (“cream-skimming”), eroding the 
profits that incumbent enterprises had used to subsidize service to low-income groups 
and high-cost areas.  Consequently, even if privatization and competition resulted in 
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might end up paying higher prices and governments might need to find ways of 
financing universal access.  Thus, policymakers in the developing and transition 
economies (DTEs) seemed to have been suffering from an apparently irreconcilable 
dilemma.  Their own understandable predilections, supplemented by powerful political 
pressures, led them to impose a set of cross-subsidies in the pricing of basic 
infrastructural services, favoring household customers at the expense of business and 
industrial customers, isolated farmers at the expense of those near the source of supply, 
and the like.  At the same time, in recent years these policymakers sought to 
competitively restructure, liberalize and privatize their public utilities. 
Others have argued that with the exception of the water sector, the stress on 
social equity in the context of the public utilities is largely misplaced--electricity and 
telecoms are valuable enough even to the poor to pay cost-reflective prices. The 
evidence from successful rural electrification in poor countries (e.g., Bangladesh) and 
elsewhere suggests that apart perhaps from fixed connection costs, consumers are 
willing to pay the full costs.  Still, in most countries there has been insufficient 
investment in the maintenance of existing public utilities’ infrastructure.  Especially in 
the developing countries, prices during the pre-reform era fell to levels that could not 
sustain a rate of investment out of retained profits to meet demand growth.  Thus, the 
reality is that many utilities around the world will need to continue raising their rates in 
order to realign them with underlying costs.  Rising utility bills will inevitably burden 
the poor and other disadvantaged groups. And as it is often pointed out, in essence 
correctly, the issue is the ability to pay and not the willingness to pay higher utility 
rates.  Affordability is an issue and affordability analysis should be an integral part of 
every utilities reform program.  However, as frequently claimed, affordability was not 
addressed carefully in the privatization and other utility reforms of the past two decades 
(AFUR 2009). 
At the intutive level there is considerable agreement on what affordability 
means--ability to purchase a necessary quantity of a product or level of a service 
without suffering undue financial hardship.  However, like poverty, this is a complex 
notion that gives rise to a host of semantic, substantive, and definitional issues and 
utlimately can be unpacked in a variety of different ways (Stone 2006).  Efforts to 
  3devise objective measures of affordability have been hampered by the substantial 
heterogeneity in people’s needs and resources and the generally poor correlation 
between affordability and acquisition (Milne 2004).  While it is widely accepted that 
basic utility services should be affordable, what this actually means in practice is rarely 
defined and even less often carefully measured. 
This paper reviews the progress made in the literature towards defining and 
measuring affordability of utilities.  It highlights the relative merits of alternate 
affordability metrics, the practical challenges to their operationalization including the 
underlying data requirements, and their implications for the design, evaluation, and 
implementation of appropriate affordability programs.  
Public Utilities Pose Special Affordability Challenges  
This paper’s focus on the public utilities is motivated by the unique economic 
characteristics of these industries, which make them a natural target for government 
intervention and render the balance between economic efficiency and social 
equity/affordability particularly delicate.  These characteristics include (Farsi et al 2008; 
Spiller and Savedoff 1999): 
 
  Extensive economies of scale and scope that generally inhibit competition and 
thus lead to tight oligopoly/monopolistic organization. 
  High ratio of sunk costs to fixed and variable (avoidable) costs that give rise to 
industry-specific barriers to entry. 
  Services that are deemed “essential” to a broad range of users, making the 
provision and pricing politically sensitive. 
 
The inherent substantial network economies (scale, scope, and joint production) 
promote concentration and discretionary behavior in pricing, network expansion, and 
bilateral dealings.  Significant sunk costs exacerbate the problem of market power and 
virtually ensure that private unregulated pricing and investment decisions will not be 
socially optimal.  Thus, concerns about market failure due to natural monopoly, the 
need to exploit all of the inherent network economies, and the critical importance of 
utility services has led to the judgement that in these sectors the public interest would be 
served better by the supersession of the market by an extensive and coherent system of 
governmental controls—i.e., a centralized system of governance (Trebing 1996) or 
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and in most countries fairness—encompassing the fundamental goals of reasonable 
rates, absence of unjust discrimination, and universal service—and efficiency in the 
provision of basic utility services have been sought through the public utility paradigm 
of governmental ownership and regulation. 
The Deficiencies of the Historic Model… 
 
Initially, the state-owned, monolithic utility model produced reasonably 
satisfactory results (Fare et al 1985). In recent years, however, it has proven 
increasingly unsuited to changing market and technological conditions in both industrial 
and developing countries.  And it ultimately has led to serious problems for the public 
interest.  The demonstrated difficulties of effectively monitoring public enterprises and 
their attendant problems of inefficiency, waste, and lethargy of operations, have raised 
serious doubts about the efficacy of public ownership, even in utility industries where 
strong propensities for market failure exist due to natural monopoly.  Moreover, inter-
country experience has clearly demonstrated the extreme difficulty of insulating public 
enterprises from the damaging consequences of fluctuating political interference.  The 
politicization of public utilities’ business has often resulted in poorly managed 
companies, with political rather than economic decisions triggering investment and the 
pricing of many important services. 
Especially in developing countries, public utilities were plagued by three related 
problems (Kessides 2004):  
  Chronic underinvestment—causing significant deterioration in service quality 
and seriously undermining providers’ ability to respond to new demands and 
expand service. As a result large portions of rural and poor urban populations 
lack access to basic services.  
  Underpricing—with both the level and structure of prices conflicting with the 
dictates of economic efficiency and arguably with social equity as well. 
  Extraordinarily low operating and financial performance—with inefficient 
public utilities draining state budgets, diverting resources from other essential 
services such as health and education, and impeding domestic economic growth 
and international competitiveness. 
 
The key problem of the old model was underinvestment in large part caused by 
underpricing.  The state-owned utilities (and not just in DTEs) have proven hopeless at 
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fell to levels that could not sustain a rate of investment out of retained profits to meet 
demand growth. Thus, inefficient pricing policies have been one of the most important 
causes for the secular deterioration in the performance of the public utilities in the DTEs 
prior to the reform era.  These countries, unfortunately, were in even less of a position 
to afford the costs of resource misallocation and inefficiency in production than their 
developed counterparts.  Price controls were imposed in disregard of the performance 
implications of the pricing rules involved, subjecting the operating entities to 
considerable financial distress and substantially impairing their ability to maintain and 
expand service, especially in poor and rural areas.  As a result, a significant portion of 
the population in many developing countries remained without access to basic utility 
services.  Moreover, the failure of many governments to prescribe adequate rate 
increases effectively decapitalized their public utilities.  Quality of service often 
suffered.  The consequent inability of financially impaired utility industries in the DTEs 
to respond sufficiently to the increasing demands of modernized economies for reliable 
utility services constrained these countries’ domestic growth and hampered their 
international competitiveness. 
Another notable characteristic of past public policies in the infrastructure sectors is 
that they have led to prices with systematic elements of cross-subsidization (Baumol 
1996; World Bank 1994; Kahn 1984).  The publicly articulated rationales for these 
policies is that they foster desirable social goals (e.g. helping certain classes of 
customers who would otherwise be disadvantaged) and positive economic externalities 
like those associated with universal service.  In actual practice, however, a substantial 
portion of the benefits frequently flowed to those outside of the intended ambit of the 
subsidy program.   The lack of strong policy attention to tight targeting led to significant 
distortions in usage and investment decisions.  Moreover, both economic theory and 
regulatory experience suggest that it is impossible to maintain significant cross-
subsidies in the structure of prices for long, with open entry and no remedial policies, 
whether or not that would seem to policy makers to be desirable. Thus, policy makers in 
the DTEs were increasingly confronted with a seemingly irreconcilable dilemma 
because of the alleged incompatibility of cross-subsidies with the promotion of market 
liberalization and competition (Baumol 1999).
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Pricing reform has been a key component of almost every reform program in the 
public utilities and remains one of the most important and challenging tasks facing 
policymakers in the DTEs.  Indeed, the historic policies of under-pricing and cross-
subsidies in the public utility industries are being reversed in many countries around the 
world.   The observed realignment of prices with economic costs is surely necessary 
both for the revenue adequacy of operators and for the public interest.  Clearly, pricing 
policies that led to fiscal drain, under-investment and inadequate maintenance did not 
serve the public well in the long run.  Moreover, despite their purported focus on social 
equity, the historic pricing policies of most DTEs did not serve the poor well either, 
since many of them have not had access to basic infrastructural services (Estache and 
Fay 2007). 
Public utility services are often regarded as “essential” both to the public and to 
the effective functioning of the economy.  Some of these services also tend to be 
extremely price and income inelastic.  Thus, their pricing has important distributional 
implications.  Subsidizing basic services, such as electricity and water, appears 
politically attractive as it can approximate a lump-sum grant, targeted in proportion to 
the number of household members.  Conversely, raising the price of basic 
infrastructural services appears like a lump-sum tax bearing heavily on the poor, elderly, 
and those with large families (Newbery 1999).  Not surprisingly, the movement towards 
cost-reflective tariffs frequently encounters strong political obstacles.  It is also, at least 
partially, responsible for the growing disenchantment with privatization reforms in 
Latin America and other parts of the world (Andres et al 2008). 
If the problem of underinvestment and poor quality is largely due to underpricing, 
then prices will have to rise and existing consumers will be upset. New consumers have 
little political voice and may not realize that the counterfactual is one in which they are 
unserved.  Moreover, if the international financial institutions are no longer willing or 
able to bail out governments, then the choice is either more taxation or higher prices. 
The latter will fall on those who benefit, and who are likely to be middle class and 
richer consumers, while the former is likely to be partly via inflation taxes which hit the 
poor, or more cash dependent parts of the population. If taxes are not raised, 
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the benefits of increased public expenditure. 
In view of the critical role of the public utilities, it is imperative that the removal 
of pricing distortions in these sectors be a key component of any economic reform 
program in the DTEs.   However, it is worth emphasizing that as a matter of policy, 
there are good reasons to avoid too abrupt price changes.  It is well known that abrupt 
and substantial price changes cause large and unnecessary adjustment costs to 
consumers and firms alike, and can lead to significant affordability problems.  Even 
optimal prices, if instituted extremely rapidly and without sufficient notice, can lead to a 
transition process that is damaging and costly and hence really far from optimal 
(Baumol 1995).  This is a point that has been unfortunately ignored in some 
privatization and restructuring programs, thereby creating public disenchantment with 
the reform process and a real danger of policy reversal.  This does not, of course, mean 
mere postponement.  On the contrary, policy makers need to plan early on for a smooth 
and deliberate transition to efficient pricing levels and structures—a transition that is 
designed to minimize the affordability burden. 
Another characteristic of the public utilities that renders the balance between 
economic efficiency and fairness/affordability delicate is the prevalence of large fixed 
and common costs that make it impossible for the supply of their services to become 
financially self-supporting with marginal cost pricing.  Indeed, the most striking feature 
of these industries is that a significant portion of their costs cannot properly be 
attributed to any of their services in particular at a specific point in time.  That is, in 
each utility, a significant proportion of costs are incurred on behalf of several of the 
utility’s activities and do not vary with the amount of the service provided (Kahn 1988).  
The apportionment rules for allocating these fixed and common costs can have 
important implications for economic efficiency.  They may also conflict with politically 
acceptable notions of fairness and can give rise to affordability concerns (Jones and 
Mann 2001; Costello 1998). 
No public policy can be justified on purely economic grounds if the polity regards 
its results as unjust.  There is a strong emerging consensus that the worldwide policies 
of privatization and market liberalization in the public utilities have brought about 
significant benefits in terms of enhanced productivity and cost-effectiveness, greater 
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market incentives rather than bureaucratic preference (Gassner et al 2008).  However, 
there are also concerns that are increasingly being expressed about the distributional 
consequences of these reform programs--especially their impacts on the affordability of 
basic service provision to poor households and other disadvantaged groups. 
Defining and Measuring Affordability 
There is a vast and growing literature evaluating the changes in consumer welfare 
due to innovation and restructuring in the supply of public utility services. Foster, 
Tiongson and Laderchi (2005) review the different strategies of analyzing the social 
impacts of utility market reforms. The approaches are remarkably heterogeneous both in 
terms of their analytical foundations and data requirements. The welfare impact 
assessment can rely upon standard neoclassical economic analysis and therefore it may 
provide estimates of the changes in consumer surplus induced by the joint changes in 
the price of, and access to, utility services (Lampietti 2004; McKenzie and Mookherjee 
2003).  Alternatively, it is based on the calibration of computable general equilibrium 
models estimating the impacts of price adjustments on the poverty and inequality 
among different household groups (Jensen et al 2008; Boccanfuso et al 2006 and 2007; 
Chisari et al 1999).  Such an assessment could also rely on the willingness to pay for 
utility services estimated from discrete choice household surveys (Wang et al 2008) or 
stated preference conjoint surveys (Yang et al 2006).  Finally, many social impact 
assessments refer to some affordability concept usually based on a “burden-threshold” 
of the household’s total income [Barrantes and Galparin 2008 (telecommunications); 
Estupinan et al 2007 (urban transportation); Fankhauser and Tepic 2006 (energy and 
water); Carruthers et al 2005 (transportation); Navas-Sabater et al 2002 
(telecommunications); Foster and Tre 2000 (energy); Milne 2000 
(telecommunications)].  
Changes in prices are often associated to changes in the quality of the services 
provided, but the potential benefits of improved quality are difficult to estimate mainly 
due to measurement problems, and are thus rarely considered (Klytchnikova and 
Lokshin 2007). Improved access to good quality utility services may significantly 
impact on many determinants of some key non-monetary dimensions of well-being (e.g. 
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community). This calls for a multidimensional analysis of well-being that merges a 
quantitative approach with a qualitative one (Kanbur 2003). The UNDP’s Human 
Development Index is an attempt to combine monetary and non monetary dimensions 
(education and health), but the debate on the suitable ways to combine the 
income/consumption poverty approach with the deprivation and social exclusion 
approach is still ongoing  (see Kakwani and Silber 2008, for the methodological debate; 
and Boarini and d’Ercole 2006, for a survey of the practices in OECD countries). 
Finally, there are cases in which the estimated measures of welfare change are not 
consistent with the public opinion discontent about the reforms (Di Tella et al 2008; 
Lora, 2008; Carrera et al 2004).  And there is a long lasting debate on how to exploit 
both “objective” and “subjective” information (see Eroglu 2006, and the references 
therein). 
Within this framework, the affordability indices can be seen as welfare indices 
which combine the standard poverty approach with a deprivation assessment. They can 
be used to provide information on the direction and magnitude of changes in consumer 
welfare due to changes in tariffs, increased enforcement of utility contracts, and 
legalization of illegal connections. An ex ante affordability analysis may help to identify 
the target population of the mitigation actions which may accompany price changes (as 
in kind or cash benefits, or the introduction of social tariffs) as well as groups who will 
oppose the innovation. An ex post analysis in the same direction may help to better 
understand the causes of the discontent. 
In what follows, we first present a survey of the measures usually adopted to 
evaluate affordability in public utility sectors - mainly relying on Miniaci et al. (2008a). 
In so doing, we explain why the standard headcount and poverty gap indices - based on 
actual and/or potential household consumption - are not satisfactory in describing the 
affordability issue. Moreover, we present new measures based on residual income and 
we discuss how to take into account  investments in infrastructure which, in turn, may 
be needed to connect more customers and improve service quality. 
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A useful construct to assess the burden of utility spending is the utility 
affordability ratio—i.e., the percentage of household budget devoted to paying utility 
bills (Fankhauser et al 2008). Some authors refer to indices which adapt standard 
poverty income measures to the case of public utility consumption. Within this 
framework, an affordability summary statistic can be provided by the percentage of 
households who spend on utility services more than a given share of their budget 
(Fankhauser and Tepic 2007). 
Formally, let us label   the total expenditure of household h, which can be 
considered as the sum of  , the observed expenditure for utilities (u), and  , the 
household’s expenditure for all other goods. The standard practice suggests to classify a 
household h as one which suffers an utility affordability problem (i.e. its utility costs 
represent an “excessive burden” on its income/budget) if its expenditure share for 











r   – exceeds a given critical “burden-threshold” level 
u r .   A 
basic headcount index HI based on the above affordability ratio is given by the fraction 
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u











where N is the total number of households,  ) ( 1  equals one if its argument is true, zero 
otherwise. 
To understand how the headcount statistic HI works, and its logical flaws, it is 
convenient to have a look at Figure 1 below, in which we define first the absolute 
poverty (budget) line as , where  ,   and   are 
the minimum quantities respectively of utility services and of other goods necessary to 
reach a decent standard of living, and where   and   are their corresponding prices. 
It should be noted that the socially-desirable minimum standards of the two goods   
and   are likely to vary with the composition and size of the household, climatic 
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amount of money” for utility services. All households whose total expenditure falls 
below the poverty line are poor (area A + B)—in the sense that they cannot afford to 
purchase the socially-desirable minimum standards of utility services and the other 
goods.  However, among them, only those whose ratio   lies above the ray  h r
u r  are 
classified as facing affordability problems (area A).  The remaining poor households (B) 
are considered not having affordability problems, even if they may be unable to afford 
heating their houses ( ). A non-negligible fraction of non-poor households 
may be classified as facing affordability problems, even though their total expenditure is 
well above the poverty line (area C in Figure 1). Moreover, note that according to this 
definition, households without access to the service – or household which are abusively 
connected to the service - are not considered as having any affordability problem at all. 
up
u h q p x 
 
Figure 1: The absolute poverty line and the HI 
 
Thus, the affordability ratio   and its associated headcount statistic HI lack 
specific consideration of the household’s ability to pay.  And they do not explicitly 
incorporate any information about the socially-desirable minimum levels of 
consumption of utility services and the other goods.  As a relative measure,   does not 
distinguish between households with widely different budgets/incomes--a household 
with $100/month utility expenditures and income/budget $1,000/month would have the 
h r
h r
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income/budget $5,000/month (Chaplin and Freeman 1999).  
Any subsidy program based on the affordability ratio and the associated headcount 
statistics will inevitably suffer from poor targeting and thus lead to undesirable 
consequences.  Households with the poorest affordability (area B) will be ignored while 
those with no genuine affordability problems (area C) could end up receiving the bulk of 
the subsidy.  Similarly, employing these constructs to assess the impacts of tariff 
rebalancing on affordability is liable to lead to misleading estimates and policy 
conclusions.  An increase in   could lead to a substantial increase in area C—i.e., the 
number of households who have no genuine affordability problems but are counted as 
being utility poor—and thus erroneously signal that the underlying policy reforms give 
rise to severe affordability problems.  Furthermore, in many empirical applications of 
HI, the heterogeneity in households’ size and incomes, as well as the disparities in 
regional infrastructure, in the equipment and quality of the items consumed appear to be 
neglected. 
u p
Another issue which typically remains outside the analysis is the “depth” of the 
affordability problem. This latter feature is specifically addressed by the “poverty gap 
index” (PGI) which takes into consideration the distance between the actual share rh and 
the critical threshold r
u as follows: 
 
N











       
where α ≥ 0 represents the policy-maker’s concern for the depth of the affordability 
issues (with α = 0, PGI = HI). This index mimics the standard FGT poverty index 
(Foster  et al 1984), it is additively separable, meaning that it can be calculated for 
different household types and aggregated using a weighted sum, where the weights are 
given by the fraction of households falling in each type relative to the total number of 
households. 
Indices of Potential Affordability 
Remaining within the same logic, which looks at budget shares, notice that both 
the HI and PGI indices can be calculated referring to what consumers actually spend 
(actual consumption levels) or to what they “would” spend to buy a pre-specified 
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these two reference points lead to very different considerations. Indeed, policy makers 
can operate in a situation where actual consumption levels may be “too high” (e.g., 
because of inefficiency or artificially low prices) or “too low” (e.g., because of extreme 
poverty conditions). If this is the case, it may thus be appropriate to construct HI and 
PGI on the basis of standard consumption levels, that is, quantity of services considered 
necessary for a decent standard of living. The budget share to look at, could therefore be 








* .        
Which allows us to write the following two new indices: 
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          
The above indices stem from a “potential affordability approach” (Thalmann 
2003) which has relevant advantages with respect to the previous ones.  First of all, this 
“potential” approach refers to a basket of public utilities which explicitly identifies the 
minimum standard of living the policy maker is targeting: this may be interpreted saying 
that the policy maker considers the public utility service as a merit good (Hancock 
1993) and, in so doing, the definition of affordability incorporates an explicit political 
choice. 
Moreover, this approach de facto permits one to exclude households characterised 
by large levels of consumption and high incomes from the identification of those with 
affordability problems (that is, now, area C in Figure 1 is excluded). In the same way, 
the potential affordability approach can correctly recognize an affordability problem for 
those households whose actual consumption is lower than the minimum standard 
quantity (i.e.: area B in Figure 1 collecting households with   is now included). 
Finally, this potential approach does not require one to forecast a household’s reaction 
to a price change, as q
up is defined in absolute terms.  
up u
h q q 
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3 In the 
empirical analyses, the amount of utility services in the reference basket varies with the 
size of the households, the climatic conditions, and possibly also with the house’s 
technological efficiency and the area of residence, while differences in the thresholds 
are difficult to defend in a policy debate.  It therefore seems a natural choice to let the 
reference basket vary, while keeping the threshold constant across households. By doing 
so it is recognized i) that needs vary across the population, ii) that utility services are 
inputs in a home production function with a given technology, which displays 
economies of scale, iii) and that the affordability issue can be solved (in the medium 
run) also by improving the technological efficiency of the households.  
Note that the approach based on the standard consumption of utility services in its 
own tends to implement “general income support” policies as the direct tool to 
overcome affordability problems: indeed, given the cost of the standard basket of utility, 
the simplest policy to solve the problem would be increasing the income of the 
households which are below the threshold.  
The Residual Income Approach 
The indices considered so far do not explicitly take into account that public 
utilities, although essential, are not the only goods households need in order to live 
decently. Families should also afford a standard basket of other goods ( ). 
These considerations have induced Miniaci et al (2008a) to adapt the approach of 
residual income from the literature of  housing economics (Thalmann 2003) to measure 
affordability in public utilities. Following this approach, there is an affordability issue 
with respect to public utility expenditure if - after having paid the public utility bills - 
the household does not have enough resources to finance a minimum level of the other 
goods’ consumption. In other words, the residual income approach allows us to consider 
a “public utility induced poverty” (Stone 1993; Kutty 2005).  
cp
c
cp q p x 
To apply these ideas, one should however specify the level of consumption of 
public utility services which is considered, as well as the consumption level of other 
goods associated to the notion of poverty. If we consider the actual level of consumption 
in utilities qh
u, a household h faces an affordability problem if its residual income  RI ≡ 
  15xh –  pu qh
u is lower than the monetary value of the minimum level of consumption of 




h u h q p q p x  
We can now observe in Figure 2 that poor households falling in E and F areas, as 
well as non-poor households belonging to the A area, face what we have called public 
utility induced poverty. 
 
Figure 2: The absolute poverty line and the residual income approach 
 
The condition   can be used to analyze the short term effects of 
price reforms in public utilities, as these markets usually lack prompt adjustments of qh
u  
in response to a price change (i.e., low price elasticity) and for this reason such effects 
can be relevant for vulnerable households. However, there are three important caveats. 
First, as in the case of the affordability measures based on the bills-to-income-ratios rh, 
if we do not introduce an upper limit to qh
u, a definition simply based the above 
condition would suffer the so- called “perverse” preferences problem (Hancock 1993): 
some households may have preferences (or having an inefficient use of the utility) such 
that--even though they can afford a higher quantity of other goods--they prefer a 
consumption level lower than the minimum standard. Second, without a lower limit, 
some households could “solve” their public utility induced poverty by reducing to 
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  162, poor households represented in the D area, do not buy the minimum standard q
up but-- 
according to the above condition--are not in public utility induced poverty.   
These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria to define public 
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With this refinement, now households falling in areas C and D in Figure 2 join the 
subset of the households in public utility induced poverty.
4 
A positive feature of the public utility induced poverty approach is that it provides 
better clues in recognizing the possible source of the affordability issue. Indeed, 
considering household groups as in Figure 2, we can observe that households in area A 
are not below the poverty line, but they are over-consuming public utility services. For 
them it is relevant to recognize whether this is due to their preferences or it is because 
they have some binding technological constraint (for instance, they are locked in with 
the heating technology). In this latter hypothesis, a targeted program would specifically 
offer incentives to increase energy efficiency through the adoption of a new technology. 
Moreover, households in C are not poor, but they are under-consuming public utilities; 
again, this can be a matter of tastes, of a better technology, or it could happen because 
they do not have access to the desired (and monetarily affordable) quantity of public 
utilities. 
Affordability and the Access Issue 
So far, we have considered the household’s consumption level, without 
considering whether that household is linked or not to the network. Especially in 
developing countries, this aspect cannot be neglected, given that the connection rates are 
often quite low.
5 Especially when considering poor countries, and even more if we look 
at rural (i.e., often the poorest) areas in those countries, an affordability analysis should 
consider the issue of whether the access to the service is too expensive. 
To this end, we can modify the above approach considering a connection fee 
which is constant and independent of the amount of the service consumed. This 
produces at least two effects: i) if households pay the connection fees, the available 
income is reduced, that is, households’ budget constraints become tighter than in the 
case where no connection fee is due, with more households under-consuming utilities 
and/or other goods.; ii) the cost of the minimum quantity of utility service, q
up, will be 
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where a is a constant connection fee. 
We can now go back to the previous analysis, in order to distinguish different 
groups of customers with affordability problems. In other words, using the above 
refined affordability condition, it becomes possible to conceptually identify at least three 
different  types of consumers: 
(i)  The (absolutely) poor, who cannot afford the minimum quantities (q
cp , q
up) .  
General income support to these households may be advisable.  Among those 
who consume lower quantities than  q
up , it would relevant to be able to pick 
out those who suffer lack of coverage and/or low reliability of the service 
provision. 
(ii)  Those “over-consuming” public utility services.  For these households it is 
important to investigate the specific reasons, so as to devise corrective policies 
(for instance, depending on whether this is due to the adoption of obsolete 
technologies or to their preferences).  
(iii)  Those “under-consuming” public utility services, possibly because of non-
monetary constraints.  Policies aimed at relaxing these constraints may be 
more effective.  In this respect, it is important to distinguish which households 
under-consume the utility because they are not really connected versus from 
those who are under-consuming because of  tight budget constraints. In the 
former group, moreover, one should identify (a) those who are not connected 
because they cannot afford it, (b) those who can afford it, but they choose not 
to get connected and (iii) those who cannot get a connection as they live in a 
neighbourhood not reached by the service. 
Empirical Analysis   
In what follows we discuss two key issues concerning the estimation and interpretation 
of the affordability indices: how to define the subsistence level of household utility 
consumption and how to identify the related data requirement.  We also present some 
empirical evidence on the different affordability ratios and the associated headcount 
statistics. 
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It is standard practice to estimate the absolute poverty line using a two step 
process (Kakwani 2003). As the first step, a food poverty line is defined following a 
“Direct Calorie Intake”, a “Food Energy Intake” or a “Cost of Basic Needs” approach; 
as a second step, the total poverty line is estimated by multiplying the food poverty by 
the inverse of the Engel ratio of the households around the food poverty line.  
The first step has its root in Sen’s approach to poverty definition in terms of a 
fixed set of capabilities
6. As noted by Ravallion (1998), it poses two main issues. First 
of all, it requires the definition of the normative capabilities of the poverty line it refers 
to, and there is no bi-univocal relation between capabilities and consumption/income 
spaces. The second step of the process has a behavioural foundation, rather than a 
normative one, and it is of little help for an affordability analysis based on the residual 
income approach. Finding a consensus on how to improve upon standard practice is not 
straightforward [see Blank (2008) for the US case) but some efforts have been made.  
Foster and Tre (2000) estimate the energy subsistence threshold for Guatemalan 
households in two alternative ways: in the first as “the average total net energy 
consumption of those households whose overall consumption levels fell within plus or 
minus 10% of the US$1 (Purchasing Power Parity adjusted) extreme poverty line”. In 
the second one, they identify a basic set of energy needs in consultation with energy 
experts based on local knowledge of energy consumption patterns among low income 
rural households. “This threshold provides enough energy to run two 60 watt light bulbs 
and one 16 watt radio for four hours each day, and incorporates a cooking requirement 
of five two kilogram logs of fuelwood each day.”  Such a threshold should in general be 
based on what would be required to perform basic functions such as lighting, cooking 
and (depending on climate) heating.  
In other terms, this follows a “Cost of Basic Needs” approach and it is consistent 
with the “capabilities” approach to poverty. But - as in the case of food – this raises the 
issue that many different consumption choices may satisfy the specified energy 
requirement: for instance, electricity can come either from (community or private) 
generators or from the grid, firewood may be substituted with (more expensive but 
healthier) LPG or electricity, and so on. The households choice set may markedly vary 
with their residence (firewood, sawdust and dung might be unavailable to urban 
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as 4% in Chad; see World Bank (2009)].   
Furthermore, households react to the relative prices of the alternative source of 
energy (Heltberg 2005; Wu et al 2004). Therefore, satisfying the minimum energy 
requirements may require different amounts of money, depending on accessibility and 
on price configurations. This is the specificity issue (Ravallion and Bidani 1994), whose 
relevance is somewhat reduced if the affordability index is computed to answer 
questions like “Were the service accessible, could the households afford to meet their 
minimum energy requirements using it?” In fact, the normative capabilities approach 
might justify paying attention not only to meeting the minimum energy requirements, 
but also – because of the health, safety and environmental externalities -  to the mix of 
fuels used. The minimum energy requirement varies with the energy efficiency of the 
accommodations and the lighting, cooking or heating technologies. This adds a further 
dimension to the specificity issue, because the household production functions are – at 
least in the short run – constrained by the stock of durables. Considering the same input 
of energy when the efficiencies of the household production functions are different 
violates the horizontal equity principle, because the welfare of the households is 
different. A different way to look at the problem is to consider the cost heterogeneity of 
the complementary capital investments required to make productive use of the energy 
(Foster and Tre 2000). 
A similar line or reasoning can be followed for other public services. As for water, 
the identification of the subsistence threshold is probably easier, but still the problems 
of multiple sources and capital costs need  to be solved. In fact, water can be provided 
by conventional piped distribution, private wells, public standpipes, private vendors or 
collected directly from nature. As in the case of energy, the degree of substitution and 
complementarity among different sources is related not only to the relative prices, but 
also to the quality and reliability of the service and its own cost of access.  
For telecommunications and transport the definition of the subsistence threshold 
should refer to the minimum quantity of these services necessary to the individuals to 
fully participate in the society they belong to. For transport this “could be interpreted in 
terms of the distance required for essential travel, such as commuting to work, 
travelling to school and visiting the local market” (Foster and Tre 2000). This, again, 
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prices and quality. In many cases the telecommunications tariffs are such that – for 
small amounts of traffic - the marginal cost of the calls is negligible relative to the fixed 
and/or capital costs. If this is the case, the consumption threshold for an affordability 
assessment of the telecommunication services can be identified with these costs. 
Data Requirements 
An affordability assessment exercise could be described as a multistage process 
with different data requirements at each stage (Foster 2000). First, it is necessary to 
identify the basic needs the affordability concept refers to. This can be the outcome of 
consultations with representatives of the stakeholders (e.g. governmental and donors 
agencies, consumer groups and service providers).   At the second stage the providers’ 
datasets together with engineering considerations can be used to  estimate the minimum 
expenditure necessary to meet the basic needs. Survey data are necessary at the third 
stage  in order to analyse how many households can afford the utilities and which are 
the main causes of un-affordability  and under-consumption. Here we focus on the third 
stage, namely on the information the survey data should provide. The ideal survey 
should provide valuable information on household conditions, their choice sets, their 
actual choice and their constraints. In more detail, the data should help to answer to the 
following questions: 
1.  Is the service accessible? Expansion of the service network has been often 
presented as a positive outcome of utility markets reforms. An affordability 
assessment without taking into consideration whether the households can or 
cannot access the services makes little sense. All households without access 
could be deemed as falling below the 
up q  line in Figure 2, and therefore as 
having an affordability problem. Accessibility information is therefore necessary 
to distinguish households who choose to spend less than the threshold and those 
who spend less than the minimum amount (probably, zero) because they do not 
have access. But a further distinction is necessary: some households may choose 
not to have access to the service, while some may be excluded because their area 
is not reached by the network. The survey should thus first of all provide 
information about the overall coverage (i.e., the potential basin reached by a 
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the utilities of interest and their close substitutes? Knowing which (energy/water 
sources, telecommunication or transport) services a household could potentially 
use (because they are available in the area) as well as which services the 
household actually uses, helps one to understand to what extent observed 
patterns of consumption reflect demand decisions or supply constraints. As the 
reference consumption bundle is defined on the basis of a normative approach, 
in order to assess how severe the affordability problem is, one must investigate 
whether spending below the thresholds means that the basic needs are met using 
cheaper strategies, or not.  
3.  Which prices and payment schemes are faced by the households? How often do 
the households fall into arrears with the bills’ payments? Prices affect the 
household’s decision to switch from one service to the other. Some alternative 
may not have a market price (e.g. firewood from the forest, water from 
community standpipes, springs or rivers). For these sources, the survey should 
provide enough information to evaluate the opportunity cost of such alternatives 
(for instance by asking  for time spent collecting wood or water). Payment 
schemes may also be crucial for the affordability of the service, with pre-
payment arrangements often preferred by poor households. Data on arrears are a 
first indicator of the affordability of the service and they can complement the 
evidence based on the definition of affordability. 
4.  Are the services reliable and of good quality? Consumers place value on 
multiple service attributes, not just costs. The unreliability of the electricity 
supply motivates a household’s investment in a private power generator, as the 
poor quality of piped water may drive the consumption of tap water. The poor 
quality of the service may push consumers towards other solutions (either 
cheaper or more expensive) in order to meet their needs, with ambiguous effects 
on the affordability index. Information on quality and reliability can be gathered 
asking objective questions (for instance about the number of hours each service 
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and water demand are conditional upon housing and the stock of durables 
available. They affect the monetary and opportunity costs of the different 
strategies to meet the basic needs, as well as the costs to connect to the services. 
6.  What is the total household consumption / income? Although cost and 
availability of a service are crucial, the main driver of affordability is the total 
resources available to the family. Whether to consider consumption or income as 
the best measure of the spending capacity of the households has originated a 
debate. In principle we would like to have both measures because, following 
Meyer and Sullivan (2003) “(t)he closer link between consumption and well-
being and its better measurement favor the use of consumption when setting 
benefits and evaluating transfer programs. However, income retains its 
convenience for determining program eligibility”.  
7.  Do the households think to spend too much or to consume too little of the 
utilities? What do they think the minimum consumption should be?  Data on the 
perceived affordability of the utilities are receiving and increasing attention, 
both for the need to evaluate the political feasibility of any proposal about utility 
market reforms, and because of the growing literature on the qualitative – 
quantitative (Q2) methods in the poverty analysis [see the special issue of the 
Journal of Development Studies, 42(7), 2006].  Finally, data on the subjective 
minimum consumption could be used to identify the value of the objective 
poverty lines (Ravallion 1998). 
In practice, finding a survey which provides all the desirable information for the 
period and the population of interest is extremely rare. For some countries national 
labour force and family expenditure surveys are available. They are typically run on 
regular basis with a representative sample of the national population. They provide 
accurate estimate of household resources, housing condition and (the expenditure 
survey) on consumption pattern, but they have little informative power on accessibility 
at the community level, prices, quality and perceived affordability. The Living Standard 
Measurement Study surveys (Grosh and Glewwe 2000) are typically informative about 
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level, on the quality and reliability of the service and subjective assessment are missing. 
The  Demographic and Health Surveys gather information on individual access only; 
information at the community level are recorded by the China Economic, Population, 
Nutrition and Health Survey together with all the necessary information about 
household income and consumption pattern, but not on opinions; household opinions 
about their living standard are instead one of the main focus of the Life in Transition 
Surveys (EBRD 2006). Designing an ad hoc household survey is obviously an open 
option, but it is costly and time consuming. 
Some Empirical Evidence 
Miniaci et al (2008a) empirically compare the affordability indices related to the 
actual and potential budget shares with the one relying on the residual income approach. 
The authors exploit the information of a standard consumer expenditure survey to assess 
the affordability of water, gas and electricity in Italy for the period 1998-2005 which 
has been characterized by major tariff reforms. They identify the reference subsistence 
level (conditional on family size and regional area of residence) as the median 
expenditure of those households deemed as relatively poor; and the threshold budget 
share as the median budget share of the actual utility bills to total expenditure for the 
relatively poor. 
 When the actual utility bill to total expenditure is considered, the utilities were 
unaffordable for 27.9% of the Italian households in 2005.  This percentage drops to 
5.9% if the ratio is based on the reference subsistence level of consumption. When they 
consider the residual income approach the fraction of households with affordability 
problems is 28.1%, but it drops to a mere 3.6% when the households who are above the 
poverty line but who spend less than the reference subsistence level are excluded (i.e. 
excluding those falling in area C).  The authors show that in the Italian case the under-
consumers do not suffer an affordability problem, as they are typically households with  
high incomes and energy efficient housing conditions. 
Monitoring Affordability: The Policy Issues   
The status of utility services is often the one of merit goods, for several reasons already 
mentioned (Le Blanc 2008). In order to avoid underconsumption or, more precisely, 
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threshold, the policy maker should try and ensure affordability. This entails a number of 
issues, which may be appropriate to analyse separately. 
How to Identify and Classify Affordability Problems 
The “best” way to define affordability depends on why we want to define it, on 
what one wants to avoid (all definitions are subject to errors of both types, including 
households which have little problems, or vice-versa) on available data and so on. As 
argued above, focussing on residual income has the advantage of allowing one to 
identify different sources of the affordability problem. In particular, it seems essential 
(within this approach, but not only) not to limit oneself to a headcount of household 
which appear to have problems, but to consider separately different cases, such as: 
(i)  Households not connected to the service; among them, it is relevant to 
distinguish those who  
a.  live in areas not covered by the service; 
b.  choose not to be connected; 
c.  cannot afford the service (possibly because access is too expensive, or 
because they forecast that they would have problems paying for future 
bills). 
(ii)  Connected households which consume less than the minimum normal quantity 
of the utility service, distinguishing in turn between 
a.  those who under-consume because of absolute poverty problems; 
b.  those who under-consume because of non-monetary constraints. 
(iii)  Households which are in affordability problems because of excessive 
consumption levels, distinguishing again between those who 
a.  “over-consume” public utility services for specific problems (e.g., 
illnesses); 
b.  “over-consume” the service for an obsolete technological endowment 
(e.g., leaking pipes, inefficient heating system, …)
7. 
If the source of the problem is identified, then different policies to alleviate affordability 
can be adopted. Clearly, when a household consumes zero because it lives in an area not 
reached by the service, access becomes a key aspect. When the reason of under-
consumption is absolute poverty, probably a general income support policy is the most 
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of the household’s technological endowment, more specific (and less easy to design) 
policies become more appropriate; notice that this is likely to be an issue especially for 
heating in cold areas. Examples of interventions of this kind can be found in Britain, 
where specific actions against “fuel poverty” may envisage a specific advice to families 
or in some parts of Italy where a plan of re-qualification of public houses (which are 
particularly old and lived in by households in need) is under discussion.  
How to Shape Cross Subsidies 
Textbook economics indicates that prices should be cost reflective, and that 
households in need should be helped with traditional income support policies. First of 
all, notice that even an “efficient” price schedule is not neutral to the distribution of 
benefits: indeed, with any change in price, however one designs it (flat; increasing block 
tariffs; …), some consumers will benefit, others may suffer a loss. The desirability of 
such a scheme, however, is that it would not convey a distorted price signal both to 
customers and to firms. 
In many cases, however, the fiscal problems of the government or its aversion to 
designing a transparent taxation scheme to fund the subsidies may make it preferable to 
have cross subsidies. Distorting the price relative to the textbook optimum is very 
common, but very hard to do “optimally”, i.e., in order to achieve a specific goal.  
When dealing with the affordability problem, ideally one would like to design 
prices such that poor households pay each unit of the service less, and rich consumers 
pay more. A scheme of this type resembles a kind of price discrimination. Following 
this notion, there may be at least two kinds of discriminatory schemes.  
The first one is based on the notion of self-selection, which entails offering menus 
of contracts, such that different income groups choose a different one, so that the poor 
end up paying less, and vice-versa. Sometimes this is done through increasing block 
tariffs, but this may go in the right direction only if the per capita consumption of rich 
consumers is higher. The evidence available, however, is that schemes of this kind often 
have regressive effects, which is intended (Komives et al  2006). 
A related way to implement the same kind of price discrimination is through the 
most common scheme used by utilities, whose payment schemes entail a quantity 
related price together with a fixed (e.g., monthly) payment, i.e., a two part tariff. In this 
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households, which are often (but not always) low income ones. Every price structure 
based on high fixed components is likely to have heavy consequences on poor 
households. 
Notice that the feasibility of quantity related price schedules crucially depends on 
the availability of metering. Given the large cost of metering devices, the potential 
benefits of such schemes should be weighed against these costs; how one compares the 
(non monetary) benefits with these (very concrete) costs, is an open issue. The answer 
will certainly depend on the specific service at stake, as meters may be very simple tools 
or fairly expensive ones. 
Moreover, sophisticated tariff schemes are unlikely to be effective screening 
devices; different consumer groups are not equally sophisticated and able to understand 
the economic implications of accepting one scheme or the other. Notice that even in 
Britain the liberalization of energy prices has often led households to choose prices 
which at the end turned out not to be to their advantage.
8 
When this kind of quantity based discrimination is considered infeasible (or not 
effective), a further alternative (third degree price discrimination)  is to try and divide 
the population into sub-groups, offering each sub-group a different price scheme. The 
problem with these “targeted” price policies is to find observable characteristics of poor 
households and design prices for the customers who have those specific characteristics. 
A typical example is given by geographic discrimination, which may be used if one 
could convincingly argue that specific areas are associated with high (or low) income 
levels.  
Access Issues: Affordability and Investments 
In situations where many customers do not have access to the service and where 
expanding the network is the key concern, the crucial pre-condition to consumption is 
providing access and making it affordable.
9 As one can expect, data confirm that the 
rate of access to utility services – especially in developing countries - is highly 
correlated with income.
10 Access is a crucial issue particularly in relatively low density 
areas, i.e., rural areas (Saghir 2005). It is often debated, or can be debated, whether 
pursuing affordability of access requires a totally different analysis and whether the 
policy implications (and potential remedies to affordability problems) are different. 
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have to do with access to the service, rather than actual consumption levels. For 
instance, for health reasons it is important that households have clean water in the 
house, not that their consumption of water is particularly large. And to enable children 
to study at home, the actual availability of electricity is certainly more important than 
promoting a large consumption of it. Therefore, while obviously the affordability of 
minimum consumption levels remains important, it seems that access to these services is 
the most crucial issue. Given this strong social interest, access qualifies as a natural area 
for public subsidies, probably even more than consumption levels themselves.  
Should these connection subsidies be different from consumption subsidies? 
Notice that while connection is a one-off decision, consumption is not. However, while 
the firm bears the cost in the initial phase, its impact on the firm’s accounts takes place 
over time as the infrastructure is amortized, and in principle one could conceive a 
connection charge spread over a significant period of time. In this perspective, a 
connection charge is no different from a fixed cost in a two part tariff: the notion of 
connection subsidy is thus quite similar to an intervention to decrease fixed components 
of two part tariffs, and improves affordability especially in services where consumption 
grows significantly with income. 
Finally, consider that the typical cost structure of utility services entails a large 
fixed cost and a variable cost which is primarily a function of the number of customers 
connected, even more than of actual quantities consumed. Recovering fixed set-up costs 
with margins on quantities consumed entails an additional distortion (and one which is 
very unlikely to provide sufficient funds in typical low price services, such as water). 
Therefore, when expanding the network is considered necessary, if access is not 
affordable we not only have a “social” problem, but we also have a problem of covering 
the set-up costs; the fewer the customers who decide to get connected, the higher the 
cost these customers have to bear. In other words, we have positive network 
externalities.  
In this perspective, when access affordability matters, measuring affordability with 
the residual income approach becomes particularly relevant. If the residual income left 
to households after paying for access is too low, households will never decide to 
connect to the network. Having a sufficient residual income is necessary (albeit not 
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index, measuring how many households do not meet this necessary condition, would 
provide a relevant indication of the likelihood that the infrastructure would be able to 
serve a sufficient number of customers. This measurement could be  particularly 
relevant for a private operators’ decision
11 to provide connection in rural areas, as it 
could help verify the possibility to recover set-up costs.
12  
Summary   
Measuring the affordability of utility services, and how affordability varies with 
price reforms, is not an easy task. The first problem is to find the most appropriate 
definition of affordability, which probably depends on the problem at hand. As we have 
seen, especially where network extensions are a key policy issue, considering residual 
income (how much a households has left after paying for the utility) provides   
particularly relevant information. An effective affordability analysis based on the 
residual income approach could be complemented by the identification of the different 
reasons why spending in public utilities may be excessive. 
The residual income approach is particularly relevant, as it opens the possibility of 
considering specific, targeted remedies to the affordability problem. For some 
consumers who fall below the poverty line, income support policies may be needed, 
while for others excessive consumption may be due to the inefficiency of their housing 
conditions or the technologies available (piping, heating systems, etc.) For many 
consumers, if a government does not want explicit subsidies, adequate price policies and 
cross subsidies may be useful.  
One of the key policy issues in developing countries is whether reaching a 
substantially larger number of households with adequate utility services would be 
economically feasible, both considering the impact on consumers’ welfare and the 
possibility to charge average prices which cover average costs.  Studying the effect of 
access fees on the residual income of potential new customers can help us understand 
the potential success of alternative investment programs. The advantage of a careful 
analysis of the origins of the affordability problem may allow one to identify how 
different price structures (e.g., an articulation of two-part tariff schemes) can affect the 
  29households’ ability to afford the utility service while respecting the constraint that costs 
must be covered by revenues. 
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1 Economic logic teaches that prices with cross-subsidies are unsustainable in an environment of open 
entry, and that such competition predictably leads to inefficiencies.  The reason is simple—entrants will 
be impelled by the profit motive to divert the overpriced business, regardless of these entrants’ efficiency, 
while entrants are unlikely to relieve the incumbent service provider from the financial burden of serving 
customers whose prices are not compensatory of the costs required to serve them.  Thus, even suppliers 
with inefficiently high costs may find entry profitable in reaction to pricing that has the mandate of 
providing a flow of cross subsidies.  Entry of this kind not only unnecessarily raises industry costs, but it 
also erodes the very ability to finance the subsidies that motivate the policy  (Willig 1994). 
2 The actual definitions of these levels of consumption is an important issue, which we leave aside for the 
moment.  
3 See Miniaci et al (2008b) for a definition of the basket in terms of relative consumption levels. On the 
advantages and the difficulty of having objective definitions, see Waddams et al (2007). 
4  A headcount index and/or a poverty gap index can now be defined using conditions 
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A headcount index based on the residual income approach HI
RI can thus be defined as: 
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5 See Komives et al (2006) and Le Blanc (2008). 
6 Sen (1985). 
7 See Miniaci et al (2008b) and Wu et al (2004). 
8 See Wilson  and Waddams (2007).   36
                                                                                                                                               
9 Chisari and Kessides (2007) developed a theoretical model to investigate the utility’s optimal pricing as 
its infrastructure network expands. 
10 As showed in Estache and Fay (2007), upper middle income countries record the largest access rate and 
“are very close to meeting the infrastructure needs of all but 10% of their population”, while lowest 
income countries are very far from these coverage needs. 
11 Another relevant indicator for investors’ decision is the system of regulatory governance: private 
operators’ commitment in long-term investments is directly related to regulatory risk, which, in turn, is 
usually evaluated on the basis of the historical experience of regulation and expectation regarding the 
future (Kessides 2004). 
12 Notice that an extended empirical economic literature - surveyed by Romp et de Haan (2005) – shows 
the impact of utilities network on economic growth: the general result shows a positive correlation 
between network’s coverage and productivity, a result which, in turn, would call for public finance 
intervention. 